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Abstract 
This review examines the evidence of the effect of government-funded outcome-based contracts in public 
human services. Outcome-based contracts in public human services are defined as those where some 
proportion of payment is triggered by some measure of change in the lives of clients. There is a lack of 
evidence comparing outcome-based contracts for public human services with other means of funding. 
There is also little evidence comparing the effect of payment on the basis of one measure of outcome to 
another, comparing outcome-based contracts to grants or block-funding models. And there is no evidence 
of the effect on outcomes of changing outcome-based payment structures as contracts progress. The 
evidence that does exist suggests that, given sufficient flexibility to do so, providers of services will 
deliver on the outcome metrics their contracts pay for. Outcome-based contracts developed so far have, 
however, struggled to create incentives to achieve the desired outcomes. The findings indicate that while 
outcome-based contracts deliver the measures of outcome for which they pay, these measures do not 
always reflect the intention of the contract designers, or desirable outcomes for the end-client. Measures 
of outcome that were not related to payment did not improve and sometimes worsened. Some outcome 
payments created incentives for service providers contrary to the achievement of desired outcomes. For 
example, employment services contracts that were meant to increase tailoring and flexibility had the 
opposite effect. Some contract conditions or environments constrained providers’ ability to affect 
outcomes. The challenge for government is to define payment metrics that represent the outcomes they 
seek and that encourage behaviour from service-delivery organisations consistent with these outcomes.  
 
 
Governments around the world are increasingly outsourcing the services they fund. For 
example, it is estimated that up to 80 percent of US human services are now being 
delivered under government contracts with external providers, many of them not-for-
profits (Collins-Comargo et al. 2011; Koning and Heinrich 2013; Martin 2005). 
Payments for these services increasingly include a component that is dependent on 
some measure of outcome (Collins-Comargo et al. 2011; Lu 2014; Martin 2005). 
Outcomes can be defined as changes made to people’s lives, or according to Martin 
(2005, 66) “results, impacts and accomplishment”. Outcome-based contracting for 
human services in most Western democracies has the longest history in employment 
services. It was introduced into US employment services in 1982, into Australian 
employment services in 1998, and via several models in New Zealand in the late 1990s 
and early 2000s (Kibblewhite and Ussher 2002). The UK introduced outcome-based 
contracting much later in employment services, in 2011, following the introduction of 
activity-based payments in the UK National Health Service in 2005. 
The increased use of outcome-based contracting sits within the wider trend towards 
performance-based contracting, which includes contracts where payments are tied to 
performance, and also those where performance simply affects contract renewals and 
extensions (Martin 2005). This review focuses on contracts where payments are 
triggered by some measure of the desired outcomes. The enthusiasm of governments to 
adopt outcome-based contracting has outpaced the production of evidence on its effect 
(Collins-Camargo et al. 2011; Lu 2014). There has been a reluctance to capture and 
build on lessons from previous regimes, with new Governments presiding over rounds 
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of consultation and re-launch of contracts, rather than conducting a program of 
incremental, informed improvements (Abetz 2015). 
Outcome-based contracting of public services can also be contextualised as part of a 
wider reform context referred to as New Public Management, part of which is the 
increased outsourcing of publicly-funded services (Nicholls and Tomkinson 2013). In 
addition to the quantity of services outsourced or privatised, new service delivery 
environments have aimed to: 
1. tailor services to the needs of the individual; 
2. allow more flexibility as to how services are delivered; 
3. increase accountability for outcomes (Considine and Lewis 2010). 
In New Zealand, the reforms of the late 1980s and early 1990s shifted the focus of 
the budget from inputs to outputs, with outputs linked to outcomes through budget 
papers. Accountability for public spending was a key driver behind these reforms 
(Kibblewhite and Ussher 2002). 
This paper begins with a definition of the terms and scope of the evidence review. It 
then sets out the aims and the search process used to identify the relevant literature. The 
methodological issues are then outlined before the findings are explained. This 
explanation touches firstly on the objectives of human services. Secondly, the effect of 
outcome-based contracts on people receiving services; governments commissioning 
services; and organisations delivering services are examined in turn. These are followed 
by a more technical discussion of the incentives and barriers created by different 
payment metrics. Finally, suggestions for future research are made and conclusions 
reached. 
The aims of the review 
This review examined the evidence of the effect of government-funded outcome-based 
contracts in public human services on clients and their communities. This began by 
looking at the basis upon which outcome-based payments are made in different 
contracts and the incentives that these payments created. The focus of the review was on 
empirical evidence, studies that contained some kind of evidence of effect, rather than 
discussion of the general policy area. The evidence of effect of outcome-based contracts 
was examined according to three stakeholder groups: government commissioners of 
services; service delivery organisations and their staff; and people receiving services. 
This includes literature on the unintended consequences created by outcome payments. 
The review aimed to determine the range and findings of evidence related to the use 
of outcome-based contracting for public human services. It hoped to uncover whether 
outcome-based contracting is more effective at achieving results for clients and what the 
unintended consequences of these contracts are. It sought to uncover the benefits and 
challenges of outcome-based contracting for people who work to deliver services. And 
finally, it aimed to suggest areas where future research on outcome-based contracting 
should be generated. 
  
3 Evidence Base 
Definition and scope 
For the purpose of this paper, the term ‘outcome-based contracting’ is used to refer to a 
contract where at least some payments are dependent on some measure of change in a 
person’s life. While not analogous with all the following terms, it includes contracts 
referred to as: 
 results-based contracting 
 performance-based acquisition 
 results-based funding 
 pay for success 
 pay for performance 
 performance-based contracting (PBC) 
 payment by results 
 performance-based service contracting 
 payment by outcomes 
Social impact bonds are briefly discussed in this review. A social impact bond is the 
specific case where the upfront service delivery costs of an outcome-based contract are 
met by a third-party investor. The investor’s eventual repayment is dependent on the 
outcomes achieved. 
The review is limited to government-funded contracts that deliver direct services to 
people to help improve their lives. It does not include the provision of infrastructure 
such as roads, or the provision of services in relation to regulatory systems like 
licensing of drivers. For the purpose of this paper, direct services for people are referred 
to as ‘public human services’ and include services that are referred to as: 
 welfare services 
 social services 
 social welfare services 
 services to vulnerable people 
The term ‘outcome’ is used to refer broadly to the changes the service makes for 
clients of the services. The word ‘clients’ is used to refer to people receiving or using 
services. 
Public services: Outcomes or activities? 
It is apparent in the literature that many outcome-based contracts included fees for 
services, or service requirements, as well as outcome payments (Brucker and Stewart 
2011; Department of Employment and Workplace Relations 2003, 2006; Department of 
Education, Employment and Workplace Relations 2009, 2012; Department of 
Employment 2015). This reflects the mix of requirements each contract places upon 
providers. For example, employment services contractors in Australia partly deliver 
support to get a job, and partly manage the requirements of receiving unemployment 
benefits from the Australian Government. This means that providers are financially 
rewarded for both the jobs they help people access (outcome payments) and the 
administration of the ‘mutual obligation requirement’ (service fees) (Department of 
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Employment 2015). Sometimes these fee-for-service components work against the 
achievement of outcomes services (Thomas 2007; Considine et al. 2011; Leon 2014). 
Proponents of outcome-based contracting often describe it as a way to optimise 
public spending and ensure better outcomes for clients (Ng et al. 2009, Outcomes Based 
Healthcare and Capsticks 2014). There is evidence, however, that outcome-based 
contracting is more applicable to some circumstances than others. For example, Leonard 
and Graff Zivin (2005) showed that, given the choice, patients preferred outcome-
focused treatments and payments for illnesses that require ongoing partnership and 
management, but fee-for-service treatments for health needs that required only one 
interaction with the service. It is important to recognise that there are publicly funded 
human services that should help clients achieve outcomes, and services that are much 
more immediate or administrative. Therefore, we should be careful not to demand all 
publicly-funded services pursue outcomes.  
Search process 
Five search strategies were employed to locate studies meeting our inclusion criteria for 
this review. These strategies were: 
1. A keyword search of research databases relevant to social policy and public policy. 
2. Examination of the bibliographies of the most relevant research papers and reviews. 
3. Searches for literature citing relevant research papers and reviews, or citing key 
government departments as an author. 
4. A search of the publication pages of key government departments. 
5. Consultation with academics studying performance-based contracts. 
Only published and professional reports were included. This review only includes 
studies published in English. Appendix 1 details the specific search elements used to 
find the studies included in this review. 
In addition a tweet was sent out to several hundred people involved in social 
services, data promotion and social research. It read: “Know of any empirical evidence 
re effect of using #performancebased/#outcomesbased contracts for social/human 
services? Tweet me a link?” No responses were received. 
Only peer-reviewed studies containing empirical evidence were included in the 
review, apart from the report from the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (1998), 
which was included because it was itself a review of a number of contracts. 
The search strategy uncovered 19 studies showing empirical evidence of the effects 
of outcome-based contracting. Publication dates ranged from 1998 to 2014 and most are 
from the United States. These studies are listed in Appendix 2. 
Overall methodological issues 
Overall, while most studies looked at the effect of outcome-based contracts on clients, 
the type of effect on those clients was highly varied. This meant that studies were not 
easily compared in terms of what they tell us about outcomes-based contracting in 
general. For example, some studies focused on time to achieve outcomes, others 
focused on the number or quality of outcomes achieved (Appendix 2). Some of the 
evidence compared outcomes from services delivered under outcome-based contracts to 
outcomes for people who received no services, rather than for people who received 
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services under other types of contracts. This makes it very hard to separate conclusions 
about the effect of the contract from those about the effect of the service. 
Most of the studies were non-experimental, which limited the findings to data or 
surveys collected after the service itself. There were three quasi-experimental studies 
(Lu 2014; McBeath and Meezan 2009; Washington et al. 2009), two of which looked at 
the impact of outcome-based contracting on clients, one in child welfare and one in 
employment. Both found improvement in performance on measures related to payment, 
but worse performance or no improvement on measures of desirable outcomes not 
related to payments. 
Some studies were able to obtain administrative data to compare the same population 
or service before and after changes were made (Brucker and Stewart 2011; Office of 
Federal Procurement Policy 1998; Faith et al. 2010). Three compared survey results 
from just after the program was implemented to ten years later (Considine et al. 2014; 
Considine et al. 2011; Considine and Lewis 2010), and one simply asked interviewees 
to reflect back on changes (Ng and Nudurupati 2010). Other comparisons pursued in the 
study designs included similar services with different payment bases (Gordon and 
Heinrich 2004; Koning and Heinrich 2013; McBeeth and Meezan 2009; Verbeeten 
2008), similar public services (Washington et al. 2009), and propensity score matching 
(Lu 2014). Five qualitative studies did not use any comparison groups, but looked at 
relationships between responses or common themes in responses (Collins-Camargo et 
al. 2011; Dias and Maynard-Moody 2007; Gates et al. 2005; Levy et al. 2012; Meezan 
and McBeath 2011). 
The focus of the 12 studies related to employment was split evenly between effect on 
jobseekers and service delivery staff. Even within studies of the effect of outcome-based 
contracts on jobseekers there is wide variation of outcomes studied. These include job 
placement rate (Considine et al. 2014; Gates et al. 2005; Koning and Heinrich 2013; Lu 
2014), time from registering in the program to gaining employment (Gates et al. 2005; 
Lu 2014), job retention/duration (Gates et al. 2005; Koning and Heinrich 2013), choice 
of clients served (Koning and Heinrich 2013), working hours (Lu 2014), and wages 
(Gordon and Heinrich 2004; Lu 2014). 
There was only one study related to child welfare that focused on outcomes for the 
child, aided by administrative data from Wayne County (Detroit), Michigan (McBeath 
and Meezan 2009). The lack of studies on outcomes for children may be due to the 
sensitivity of the data and the difficulty of collating it from thousands of disparate case 
files. The other four studies on child welfare looked at service delivery organisations 
and their staff. Two looked at the changes in backend organisational practices such as 
IT systems and internal communications (Collins-Camargo et al. 2011; Meezan and 
McBeath 2011), and two looked at factors affecting staff satisfaction and intention to 
quit (Levy et al. 2012; Washington et al. 2009). 
While we know there are several examples of outcome-based contracting in New 
Zealand (Kibblewhite and Ussher 2002), the literature search did not uncover any 
empirical studies of them. 
The rest of the review examines the effect of outcome-based contracts by specific 
stakeholder group. The most common stakeholder group studied in the literature was 
clients – the people receiving services. Service delivery organisations and their staff 
were the next most frequent focus, and a few studies looked at the effect on government 
agencies. 
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Effect on people receiving services 
Most of the studies found an improvement in outcomes for recipients of human services 
delivered through outcome-based contracts. But while the quantitative measures of 
performance rewarded by payment almost always improved, Verbeeten (2008) found 
that unmeasured quality of services did not follow suit. One example of this is frontline 
staff delivering employment services in Australia, who reported feeling that over time 
they had less flexibility to deliver services tailored to the individual needs of their 
clients (Considine et al. 2011).  
Employment services 
Designers of outcome-based contracts in employment services are continuously 
adjusting their outcome-metrics and payments in an effort to create the desired set of 
outcomes for jobseekers (Considine et al. 2011; Department of Employment 2015; Leon 
2014; Thomas 2007). Most outcome-based employment services contracts have tiers of 
payment, where people who face more difficulty finding and sustaining work attract 
higher payments (Department of Employment 2015; Lu, 2014). Despite this, several 
studies found that the incentives to service the most difficult clients were insufficient: 
these clients had poorer outcomes, were underserved, or ‘parked’ (Business Council of 
Australia 2014; Koning and Heinrich 2013; National Audit Office 2015). At the other 
end of the spectrum, ‘cream skimming’, the practice of favouring easier to serve clients, 
was also evident (Davidson and Whiteford 2012).  
These practices, which were a direct response to incentives in employment services 
contracts, became a significant political issue in Australia in the late 1990s (Considine 
et al. 2011). In response, payments for finding work placements for those who have 
been unemployed for longer were increased (Davidson and Whiteford 2012) and 
payments for providers to work with those most likely to find jobs were lowered 
(Department of Employment 2015). More external regulation was also introduced, 
which Considine et al. (2011) found led to more conservative and standardised practices 
within service delivery organisations. This contrasts with the intention that outcome-
based payments would lead to more service flexibility and tailoring. Employment 
services in New Zealand were not significantly privatised, although those on jobseeker 
benefits are still required to meet work obligations in order to receive benefits (Ministry 
of Social Development 2016). 
As discussed earlier, most employment services contracts are structured using a 
mixture of service fees and outcome payments. Service fees are related to the 
administration of what in Australia is called the ‘mutual obligation requirement’ 
(Department of Employment 2015), i.e. the activities that must be fulfilled in order for 
unemployment benefits to continue to be paid. Outcome payments are attached to 
milestones related to achieving and then sustaining employment. For unemployed 
people who are most likely to get a job, the service delivery organisation is paid more 
through outcome-based payments. Conversely, payment for those who are less 
employable is more through service fees (Department of Employment 2015; Koning 
and Heinrich 2013). While this encourages the service of clients who have more 
difficulty accessing the job market, it lessens the incentive to find them employment, as 
it becomes more efficient to work for service fees than outcome payments.  
The balance between fees and outcome payments is hard to get right and 
employment contracts are frequently adjusted to correct for unintended consequences 
(Considine et al. 2011; Leon 2014; Thomas 2007). The UK National Audit Office 
(2015) found that sometimes the value of service fees and outcomes payments has been 
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set such that providers will pursue only the service fee. They reported that clients were 
registered with programs, triggering the payment of an ‘attachment fee’, but payments 
for achieving outcomes were insufficient for service providers to invest the time and 
effort necessary to pursue them. Gates et al. (2005) found that weighting payments 
heavily towards sustained employment milestones (up to nine months employment) 
encouraged providers to work with people early and liaise with other government 
support agencies to find jobs that people want to keep. In contrast, Dias and Moody 
(2006) found that the absence of service fees resulted in insufficient time being spent 
with clients to address their barriers to employment and thus secure rewarding jobs that 
would last.  
The number of fees in Australian employment service contracts more than 
quadrupled from 2000 to 2009 (Department of Employment, Workplace Relations and 
Small Business 1999; Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations 
2009), creating incentives for service providers to provide services that attracted fees, 
such as training. The result of this was that services provided training that did not 
progress a person towards work (Leon 2014; Business Council of Australia 2014). The 
Business Council of Australia (2014) described the system as one where the set of 
rewards and penalties were not aligned to employment outcomes. 
Three studies showed an improvement in employment outcomes that were directly 
related to payments (Gates et al. 2005; Koning and Heinrich 2013; Lu 2014), but there 
was no evidence of improvement in other desirable outcomes that were not payment-
related (Koning and Heinrich 2013; Lu 2014). One example of this occurred when 
outcome-based contracts rewarded placement in a job; they achieved higher placement 
rates and shorter time to placement, but there was no evidence of these contracts 
increasing job duration or wages (Dias and Moody 2006; Koning and Heinrich 2013; Lu 
2014). Considine et al. (2014) looked at profit-maximising attitudes and there was no 
relationship between these attitudes and improved outcomes for jobseekers.  
Child welfare 
There was only one study looking at the effect of outcome-based contracting on 
outcomes for children in care. Like employment services, services for children in care 
performed better on outcomes related to payment, but showed no improvement or worse 
outcomes for outcomes not related to payment. Reuniting a child with their biological 
family is widely considered the optimal outcome, however requires more resources than 
placing the child with another family or carer. When the outcome payments related only 
to placement in any family situation, placement rates rose overall, but the rate of 
placement with biological families dropped (McBeeth and Meezan 2009). 
Effect on service delivery organisations and their staff 
Meezan and McBeath (2011) found that for service delivery organisations and their 
staff, the transition to outcome-based contracting has been a source of anxiety, but 
concerns relating to revenue loss and high staff turnover were greater in anticipation of 
the transition than after it had occurred. In contrast, they found the organisational 
change required for the transition was underestimated by those yet to go through it. 
Other studies found the flexibility to respond to outcome payments was far more 
apparent in some contract settings than others, and strongly affected the role staff felt 
they played in decision-making (Considine et al. 2011; Nicholls and Tomkinson 2013). 
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Findings were not consistent across countries. Considine and Lewis (2010) found 
that with the introduction of outcome-based contracting for employment services, work 
satisfaction decreased in Australia, increased in the UK, and remained steady in the 
Netherlands. The daily number of clients seen by staff increased in Australia but 
decreased in the other two countries. They reported that the workforce in Australia 
became younger and more female, while in both the UK and the Netherlands the 
workforce aged and became less female.  
Despite being introduced with the intention of allowing providers to tailor services to 
individual needs (Davidson and Whiteford 2012), Dias and Moody (2006) found that 
outcome-based employment service providers and their staff reported a decrease in 
flexibility to tailor services, and other studies described how frontline staff chose 
options that were explicitly approved by their government agency in order to avoid 
penalties for making the wrong decisions (Considine et al. 2011; Thomas 2007). Further 
iterations of the Australian employment services contract sought to reduce the 
administrative burden, while strengthening incentives to produce outcomes and increase 
flexibility (Department of Employment 2015).  
The reason for this decrease in flexibility was partly an increase in government 
compliance measures and partly the reaction of service providers. Considine et al. 
(2014) found that staff reported a reduction in organisational appetite for innovation, in 
addition to an increasing administrative and compliance burden imposed by 
government. This manifested in onerous reporting requirements by delivery 
organisations on their staff, on top of what was required by government. The constantly 
changing contracting environment led to an increase in compliance-focused 
administration, furthering the loss of flexibility and innovation. Considine et al. asked 
about the computer system prescribed by the Australian contracting department, finding 
‘close to 70 per cent of Australian employment services staff reported that a computer 
program directs them in their job, suggesting that flexibility was not a prominent feature 
of Australian employment services by 2008’ (2011, 7). Providers at the time of these 
findings were delivering services under contracts that detailed 132 different payments 
(Department of Employment and Workplace Relations 2006).  
In contrast, staff delivering the Peterborough Social Impact Bond (delivered under 
only one payment metric) reported an increase in flexibility for innovation and the 
ability to continuously improve how outcomes are pursued: ‘We’re not being dictated 
to. We can shape the delivery model to meet needs’ (Nicholls and Tomkinson 2013). 
One of the key constraints for the achievement of employment outcomes is the number 
of jobs available. While most social outcomes are affected by the economic, policy, 
legal and cultural context in which they are pursued, the relationship is not as direct as 
the one between employment outcomes and availability of jobs. The number of 
unemployed people in Australia correlates more strongly with the number of job 
vacancies than any changes to employment services contracts. 
In relation to child welfare services, McBeath and Meezen (2008) found that contract 
incentives sometimes negatively influenced employee behaviour. Performance 
deadlines were found to adversely impact employees’ ability to conduct thorough 
assessments, provide necessary services, and access community resources. 
Effect on government commissioners of services 
Government commissioners are hindered by a lack of evidence with which to design 
effective outcome-based contracts (National Audit Office 2015) as well as a lack of 
evidence as to the effect of these contracts on outcomes once implemented (Gates 2004; 
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Hedderman 2013; Lu 2014; National Audit Office 2015). Despite the challenges, 
studies found the benefits of outcome-based contracting for governments included 
lower prices (Office of Federal Procurement Policy 1998; Sturgess et al. 2007) and 
improved internal practices (Collins-Camargo et al. 2011), and no discernable increase 
in administrative costs (Koning and Heinrich 2013).  
Government agencies designing outcome-based contracts for the first time have had 
difficulty developing metrics on which to base their payments. This includes 
establishing a baseline for outcome improvement, and the size of the potential 
improvement. The National Audit Office (2015) found that the Department of Work and 
Pensions overestimated the proportion of participants that would have found jobs 
without the support of the program, and also failed to model performance in different 
economic environments, resulting in every provider failing to meet minimum targets 
and being placed on a performance improvement plan. They also designed the payment 
regime before a system of validating it; it was estimated that from 2011 to 2014 they 
paid £11 million in invalid payments. 
There were some benefits to public servants’ practices as they moved to managing 
outcome-based contracts with private providers of child welfare services. Collins-
Camargo et al. (2011) observed positive changes in four areas: collaboration; 
communication; clearly defined and agreed performance; and integrated systems. While 
these practices would be considered desirable for any system of contracting, they 
became necessary for outcome-based contracting and were implemented in response to 
the demands of delivering the new contracts. 
Koning and Heinrich (2013) did not find a difference between the administrative 
costs to government of full or partial outcome-based payments (i.e. whether 100 per 
cent or 50 per cent of payments were dependent on performance). A US review of 26 
contracts from fifteen agencies that had transitioned to include performance-based 
payments showed that this transition had led to an overall 15 per cent decrease in price 
and 18 per cent increase in customer (government agency) satisfaction (Office of 
Federal Procurement Policy 1998). This is consistent with evidence relating the use of 
performance-based contracting to reduction of contract cost/size (Sturgess et al. 2007). 
The Office of Federal Procurement Policy (1998) also found an increase in the time 
spent to develop contracts for technical and professional services, alongside a 93 per 
cent decrease in audits overall. This investment of time in contract development, rather 
than contract management, has been mirrored in the development of outcome-based 
contracts for social impact bonds (KPMG 2014).  
The basis upon which outcome-based payments are made 
Many of the issues discussed above are a direct result of the incentives created by 
outcome-based payments. Outcome-based contracts create incentives linked to the way 
the payment-related outcome is defined and measured. There may be several different 
ways to measure one outcome, for example reducing reoffending. Different measures 
will contain different incentives. We can compare outcome-based payments for 
prisoners exiting Peterborough and Doncaster prisons to examine how this plays out in 
practice. The outcome measures are (Ministry of Justice, 2014): 
For Peterborough prison the outcome measure is the frequency of re-conviction events (based on 
offences committed within 12 months of release from prison and convicted at court within those 
12 months or a further 6 month period). This is often referred to as a frequency measure.  
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For Doncaster prison the outcome measure is the proportion of offenders who commit one or more 
offences in the 12 months following release from prison and are convicted at court in those 12 
months or in a further 6 months. This is often referred to as a binary measure. 
Nicholls and Tomkinson (2013) found that the Peterborough prison measure 
encouraged service providers to work with prisoners over the entire 12 months post-
release, regardless of whether they were reconvicted in that time or not. The potential 
financial reward to work with prisoners who are expected to reoffend more frequently 
over that period is greater than the potential financial reward from working with 
prisoners who might reoffend once or twice. In contrast, Hichens and Pearce reported 
that the Doncaster prison measure encouraged the service provider to cease working 
with a prisoner if they were reconvicted within the 12 month post-release period, as this 
meant no financial reward would be gained from the prisoner: ‘Some delivery staff 
reported frustration that support is withdrawn, undermining the interventions previously 
undertaken’ (2014, 1).  
In some cases outcome-based contracts are introduced to correct for the perverse 
incentives created by previous contracts. Faith et al. (2010) studied Philadelphia’s 
mental health residential services, where payments had been based on the availability of 
beds, which resulted in very low occupancy rates. Despite there being unmet demand 
for these beds, the financial incentive for providers to keep them empty had been strong. 
Performance-based contracting was introduced to correct this. Provider payment 
became based on actual occupancy, with incentive payments for high levels of 
occupancy and sanctions for low levels. Outcome-based payments were then added to 
improve patient outcomes. 
Difficulties, limitations and barriers 
The incentives created by outcome-based payments aren’t always pursued, and depend 
on the wider contracting environment, relationships between stakeholders, and 
limitations placed on the ability of service providers to respond. 
The New Zealand Department of Corrections uses public performance reporting, 
related to a series of financial penalties and rewards, to manage the contract for the Mt 
Eden Corrections Facility (MECF). MECF’s new buildings opened on 30 March 2011 
(Department of Corrections 2010). The quarterly reporting requirements of the Mt Eden 
Correctional Facility contract, awarded to Serco by New Zealand’s Department of 
Corrections in 2011, include 37 performance measures, 14 key performance indicators 
(KPIs), and a rehabilitation score. Most of the performance measures are inputs, 
activities or outputs (although a few, such as unnatural death, would be considered 
outcomes). The KPIs are mostly outcome measures, such as improved wellbeing, and a 
rehabilitation score (Department of Corrections 2011). Despite being the only prison 
ranked ‘Exceptional’ in the 12 months to March 2015 (Department of Corrections 
2015), a number of violent incidents at the Mt Eden Correctional Facility led to the 
government assuming control of the facility in July 2015 (Gulliver 2015). This is an 
interesting contrast between performance reflected by a fairly extensive range of 
measures, public perception, and government action. 
A significant barrier to the incentives created by outcome-based payments is the 
freedom by which they can be pursued. Outcome-based contracts represent a significant 
cultural shift for people who have been involved in human service delivery over time. If 
the contract tightly prescribes the service that must be delivered, the ability of the 
provider to adapt services and their resourcing in the pursuit of outcomes is curtailed. 
Tomkinson (2015) explored the example of the Rikers Island Social Impact Bond, 
contracted by New York City government. The service was defined by a rigid service 
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model that had proven effective on other populations of juveniles in detention. 
Payments from the New York City government would occur, however, from the 
reduction in reoffending by young men exiting Rikers Island. Although the service 
providers recognised that achieving a reduction in reoffending would require services 
outside the scope of the program that had been funded, they were restricted from 
delivering these services by their contracts. In this example, the primary purpose of the 
program as it was defined in the contracts was to test a particular service model, while 
the payment related to a different purpose – that of reducing the reoffending of the 
young men incarcerated on Rikers Island. 
The specific case of social impact bonds 
Social impact bonds have two distinct features: (1) an outcome-based contract between 
a service commissioner (usually government); and (2) private investment to cover 
working capital until outcome-based payments start to flow. Some of these outcome-
based contracts have involved stepped payments, where a greater improvement in some 
measure of outcome reaps higher payments. These contracts have all, however, been 
implemented in service gaps. This means their effect is compared to no service, rather 
than to services delivered under traditional contracts or grants; their effect compared to 
another type of contract not being measured would be very difficult to establish. An 
example of the evidence as to the effect of these contracts is that in comparison to a 
matched group of ex-offenders who received no additional services, the ex-offenders 
eligible to participate in the Peterborough Social Impact Bond were reconvicted 8.4 per 
cent less (Ministry of Justice 2014).  
Two social benefit bonds, known elsewhere as social impact bonds, were 
implemented in New South Wales (NSW) in 2013. They are based on outcome-based 
contracts between the NSW Government and not-for-profit service providers, where a 
proportion of payments is dependent on outcomes. Some funding is provided by 
external investors, whose returns are also dependent on outcomes. Payments are based 
on the proportion of children in care returned to their families or remaining with their 
families (NSW Treasury 2014). Outcome-based contracting was a new experience for 
the NSW Department of Family and Children’s Services, and also for the two not-for-
profit providers, UnitingCare and The Benevolent Society (Tomkinson 2012). The 
difficulty of defining a suitable measure of outcome was evident in the amending of the 
UnitingCare contracts less than two years into the program, to recognise that some 
children restored to their families will return to state care (Tomkinson 2015). Once 
again, the effect of these contracts is measured in comparison to families that did not 
receive services at all, so cannot be conclusively attributed to the payment basis. 
Some social impact bonds, for example those contracted by the Department of Work 
and Pensions, do not measure effect size at all. They make outcome payments without 
comparison to an estimate of what might have happened for clients in the absence of the 
service. 
Further research 
Further research should produce an evidence base that can be called upon by policy-
makers to inform their decision-making. It will also need the cooperation of policy-
makers, as quality research will most effectively be produced if it is designed along with 
new contracts and services. The contribution of more robust data in the form of 
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randomised controlled trials could be delivered in the process of rolling out future 
policy or contracting changes (Haynes et al. 2013).  
A robust evidence base would include studies that focus on the effect of changing the 
basis of payments for outcome-based contracts. This would compare contracts that have 
different payment bases for a similar service. Comparison could be pre- and post- a 
particular change, or across areas as outcome-based contracts are rolled out across a 
jurisdiction. As well as studies comparing different payment bases, studies could 
compare the outcomes of entirely different payment models, for example, block funding 
or grants. 
In studies where the comparison is a service delivered by the public sector, the 
literature has not separated the effects of outcome-based contracting from the effects of 
privatisation and market-based approaches. The literature is interesting where the 
evidence contradicts beliefs about market-based approaches – for example, where 
outcomes-based contracting led to greater collaboration. Further research might 
compare services delivered by the public sector with those delivered under both 
outcome-based contracts and more traditional contracts. Real value will be produced if 
studies are able to isolate the effects of different contracting variables. 
The comparability of studies would be greatly increased if the variation between 
them were reduced. The replication of studies across different contracts and services 
would be highly valuable. The inconsistency of findings across countries could be 
further investigated, in an attempt to isolate the variables that are causing differences. 
The identification of specific practices in different countries, and their effects, would 
help policy-makers to deliberately introduce features of contracts that have desirable 
outcomes. 
As the number of studies increases, one approach (for example) could be to 
categorise welfare/human services in terms of how they meet user needs: primarily for 
maintenance (e.g. aged care), for long-term development (e.g. increasing employability 
of long-term unemployed people), or for short-term development (e.g. getting a job, 
passing an exam), as well as being framed to regulate users. A key issue for policy and 
research would then be how the requirements or challenges for successful outcome-
based contracting differ in each of these cases. 
A further area for exploration is comparing outcomes between outcomes-based 
contracting and relational contracting (where a relationship of trust forms the basis of 
decisions) or alliance contracting (where unanimous decisions are made by all parties as 
the contract progresses). 
Longitudinal analyses of outcomes would allow for understanding of the permanence 
of outcome changes, which would inform the understanding of cost-effectiveness of 
different interventions, intervention points, and outcome-based contracts (Gordon and 
Heinrich 2014). 
Finally, empirical evidence on New Zealand examples is ripe for future studies. 
These would be strengthened if they were constructed in parallel with similar studies in 
Australia and other countries. 
Conclusion 
The main finding of this review is that there is a severe lack of evidence for policy-
makers to draw on when constructing outcome-based contracts. The studies that have 
been done are not comparable, and largely fail to isolate contracting variables, so it is 
difficult to identify cause and effect. Despite the scarcity of studies containing empirical 
evidence, several conclusions can be drawn. 
13 Evidence Base 
The literature reflects that outcome-based contracts have a longer history and are 
more widely used in some human services than others; 12 of the 19 studies reviewed 
relate to employment. There is, however, no evidence that employment is any better or 
worse suited to outcome-based contracting than any other service area. 
The studies discussed suggest that outcome-based contracting can help achieve 
specific, observable changes, but is less effective for non-contracted outcomes and those 
that are difficult to define. Also, there is evidence that a strong focus on certain 
outcomes or outputs may work against achieving other (sometimes more important) 
outcomes.  
Outcome-based contracts were shown to deliver improvements in the metrics by 
which they were paid, but these metrics proved difficult to align with desired outcomes. 
The challenge for government has now become to define payment metrics that represent 
the outcomes they seek, and that encourage behaviour from service-delivery 
organisations that is consistent with these outcomes. Despite a raft of hopeful promises 
written into contract revisions and announcements, outcome-based contracts for 
employment services have not resulted in increased flexibility and innovation, the 
tailoring of services to the individual, or improved outcomes for participants.  
The evidence suggests that the rhetoric of outcome-based contracting does not 
always reflect its reality. While this may be true for many other aspects of policy-
making and implementation, in outcome-based contracting there is a tendency towards a 
simplistic representation of human services outcomes that exacerbates the divide. As 
problems are uncovered and corrected, the contracts themselves become complex and 
unwieldy. These problems may reflect a lack of capacity in the public sector to build 
and define outcome-based contracts for service, as well as a lack of capacity within 
delivery organisations to negotiate and deliver them. Both of these areas of capacity 
need to be taken into account by public sector managers charged with the 
implementation of outcome-based contracts. 
As well as a lack of capacity for designing and implementing outcome-based 
contracts, there appears to be an inadequate investment of time and skill spent 
rigorously thinking through the intended and unintended consequences of new 
contracts. This may be partly due to the additional time the outcome-based contracting 
process requires, and the pressure that puts on policy-makers. Policy-makers are not 
always open to the input of those outside government, or may not be willing or able to 
adequately consider it. In employment services, for example, many of the problems 
arising were predicted by external organisations, but dismissed during the contracting 
process.  
The studies raise the question of whether it is beneficial to include more than one 
type of payment in any one contract, or whether perverse incentives might be better 
managed by separating them into different contracts. This includes contracts that 
involve more than one outcome-related payment, as well as contracts that mix outcome-
based payments and service fees. This separation may solve the problem, or it may just 
push conflicts out to a system level. The evidence also showed that while there is a 
trend towards producing life-changing outcomes from public human services, 
sometimes people seek a simple one-off service. The use of outcome-based payments 
and service fees should reflect the service that is being sought. 
Finally, service providers need to have the freedom to respond to the incentives 
created by outcome-based contracts. The achievement of outcomes can be severely 
constrained by the contracting environment or by prescriptive conditions in the contract 
that work against the intended outcomes.  
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Appendix 1: Search terms 
Research databases: 
 Web of Science 
 Google Scholar 
The keywords searched for in the above databases include: 
 Outcome* and contract* in title 
 Performance and based and contract and Australia 
 ‘Payment by results’ and ‘welfare’ 
 Job* service* Australia* in title 
 Outcome based contract* 
 Performance based contract* 
 DEEWR 
 Evaluation Job Network Australia [Google Scholar] 
 Evaluation Job Services Australia [Google Scholar] 
 Outcome-based contracting 
 Payment by results 
 Outcome based contract* NZ [Google Scholar] 
 McBeath and Meezan in author 
 Considine in author 
 All of the above generic search terms and New Zealand 
The search of the above databases also looked for literature citing: 
 McBeath, B and Meezan, W 2006. Nonprofit adaptation to performance-based, 
managed care contracting in Michigan's foster care system, Administration in Social 
Work, 30(2): 39-70. 
 McBeath, B and Meezan, W 2009. Governance in motion: Service provision and child 
welfare outcomes in a performance-based, managed care contracting environment, 
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 20(suppl 1): i101-i123. 
 
 
 Appendix 2 
Table 1: Summary of evidence by outcome and policy domain 
Study Study focus Effect on Findings 
Employment: Effect on jobseekers 
Gates et al. 2005 Provider hours 
Harder to serve 
 Getting a job 
 Time to employment 
 Job retention 
Outcomes funding was associated with successful employment for people 
with psychiatric disabilities. The performance-based funding structure may 
encourage providers to work more intensively with consumers early in the 
placement process, find jobs that consumers want to keep, and coordinate 
more effectively with the state rehabilitation agency 
Koning and Heinrich 
2013 
Full vs partial vs no 
performance payments 
 Job placement rate 
 Administrative cost 
 Parking - underserving or ignoring 
clients 
 Choice of client group 
 Job duration 
Although job placement rates for some workers increase with performance 
payments, job duration was unaffected. In addition, job placement rates for 
those with poorer employment prospects did not increase under high-powered 
incentive contracts. 
Considine et al. 2014 profit-seeking behaviour 
by frontline staff 
Rate of jobseekers getting jobs The increase in profit-seeking behaviours in Australia's not-for-profit 
employment services has not led to improved employment rates for clients. 
Lu 2014 OBC  Time to placement in job 
 Likelihood of placement in job 
 Working hours 
 Wages 
The performance-based contract performed much better on measured 
performance, with a higher chance of employment and a shorter time-to-
placement. But the differences in unmeasured performance between the two 
models in terms of working hours and wages were trivial. 
Gordon and Heinrich 
2004 
Comparison of four 
models of analysis: the 
linear selection on 
observables, first 
difference, difference-
in-differences, and 
multilevel models. 
Apparent wage differences of mothers 
on different programs 
Multilevel modelling captures both the jump (approximately $1,800, $1,000–
$1,200 higher than comparison group) and subsequent decline in earnings’ for 
one program's mothers (Just over $100 each quarter), but the other 
econometric models do not 
 Employment: Effect on service delivery organisations and their staff 
Dias and Maynard-
Moody 2007 
Payment metric Frontline service delivery practices The payment for job placement resulted in management pushing a 'work-first' 
approach, so frontline workers felt that they couldn't properly help clients to 
get good jobs or address employment barriers. Frontline workers and 
jobseekers felt the service provided exacerbated the problems faced by 
jobseekers and produced poor outcomes  
Considine et al. 2011 Privatisation and OBC  Flexibility 
 Innovation  
Privatisation of service delivery has resulted in less flexibility and an increase 
in standardised practices i.e. less innovation/tailoring services to the jobseeker 
Considine and Lewis 
2010 
Country and time (1998 
to 2008), classified by 
governance types 
Frontline service delivery practices: 
 Female staff (%) 
 Staff under 34 (%) 
 Union members 
 Caseload/FTE 
 Number of jobseekers seen per day 
 Time spend with jobseekers 
 Work satisfaction 
Employment services staff were happier in Neth and UK than in Aust. The 
proportion of female and younger staff has increased significantly in 
Australia over the first ten years of outcome-based contracting, contrary to 
the UK and Netherlands. At the same time, the number of jobseekers seen per 
day increased in Australia but decreased in the other two countries. 
Child welfare: Effect on children 
McBeath and Meezan 
2009 
Reform towards 
outcome-based contracts 
Reunification rates 
Permanent placement rates 
Pilot children are 18% less likely to be reunified with birth parents, but 24% 
more likely to achieve permanent placement by the end of the study. 
Reunification required more effort than other permanency options. Payment 
was for placement (allocation to a home and carer(s)), with no extra for 
reunification. 
Child welfare: Effect on service delivery organisations and their staff 
Collins-Camargo et al. 
2011 
Reform towards 
outcome-based contracts 
Service delivery organisational 
practices 
In an environment of privatisation and performance-based contracts, service 
delivery organisations focus more on interorganisational partnerships; shared 
decision making; new/increased internal communication; developing goals, 
objectives and measures of performance; integrated research, data and case 
management systems 
Meezan and McBeath 
2011 
Reform towards 
outcome-based contracts 
Service delivery organisational 
practices 
When moving to outcome-based contracts, not-for-profits altered (or expected 
to alter) staffing patterns and staff assignments, staff training, and the ways in 
which budgeting and financial management were handled. In some agencies, 
the pilot (outcomes) contracting environment necessitated (or was expected to 
necessitate) greater interdepartmental coordination of shared tasks between 
service delivery, finance, and IT systems  
 Washington et al. 2009 Reform towards 
outcome-based contracts 
Satisfaction with extrinsic rewards 
Rate of salary raises 
Expectation of continues employment 
Satisfaction with benefits 
Rate of promotions 
For private sector under outcome-based contracts: Work Environment, 
Satisfaction with Extrinsic Rewards and rate of salary raises higher, no 
statistically significant difference for expectation of continued employment, 
or satisfaction with benefits, or rate of promotions. 
Levy et al. 2012 Job satisfaction, 
organisational 
commitment, and 
conflict between work 
and family 
Intention to quit of service delivery 
staff 
Intention to quit was related to job satisfaction and work-family conflict, but 
not organisational commitment, family-work conflict, years of experience or 
hours per week. 
Other policy domains: Effect on clients 
Leonard and Graff 
Zivin 2005 
Health: illness type Choice of healer - between pay by 
outcome and fee-for-service 
When the illness requires large amounts of effort on the part of both patients 
and practitioners, patients are more likely to choose a traditional healer 
(paying by outcomes). Patients prefer mission facilities (fee-for-service) when 
either the patient or the practitioner needs to exert effort to cure the illness, 
but not both. 
Verbeeten 2008 Public sector internal 
Several variables: 
(a) Clear and measurable 
goals 
(b) Incentives 
(c) Decentralisation 
(d) Performance 
measurement system 
(e) Number of FTE staff 
(f) Sector 
QUANTPERF: quantity or amount 
of work produced; attainment of 
unit production or service goals; 
efficiency of unit operations; 
QUALPERF: quality or accuracy 
of work produced; number of 
innovations or new ideas by the 
unit; reputation of ‘work 
excellence’; morale of unit 
personnel 
Quantitative performance was related to incentives, but qualitative 
performance was not. There were relationships found between quantitaive 
performance and incentives; and clear and measurable goals and 
performance. Relationships between other variables (inc. quality of service 
and incentives) were not found. 
Brucker and Stewart 
2011 
Substance abuse: 
Introduction of 
performance incentives 
Time to assessment 
Time to treatment 
Participation 
Retention 
Completion 
The introduction of performance incentives had no effect on timeliness of 
access to assessments or treatment, length of stay, completion of program. 
Note that less than 7% of total budget was performance-based, and only 
18.83% of it was claimed.  
 Other policy domains: Effect on governments 
Faith et al. 2010 Mental health residential 
services: Introduction of 
payment rewards and 
sanctions tied to bed 
occupancy rates 
Occupancy rates of beds Tying payments to occupancy rates of beds in mental health residences met 
objective of increasing occupancy 
Office of Federal 
Procurement Policy 
1998 
Across US Govt: 
Introducing PBC for non-
human services only 
Price 
Satisfaction of government agency 
Price decreased, satisfaction increased, both improved more when new 
providers were chosen, audits decreased and leadtime increased 
Ng and Nudurupati 
2010 
Defence: Dealing with the 
risks and challenges of 
outcome-based contracts 
Service delivery organisational 
(backend) practices 
Found 11 factors that mitigate risks/challenges of OBC - Align expectations; 
Team work; Share information; Share materials; Access resources; Clear 
roles; Complementary skills; Empowerment; Behaviours and attitudes; 
Customer’s control; Delivery org's control 
 
